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Abstract. Cloud computing is a new service delivery paradigm that
aims to provide standardized services with self-service, pay-per-use, and
seemingly unlimited scalability. This paradigm can be implemented on
multiple service levels (infrastructures, run-time platform, or actual Soft-
ware as a Service). They are are expected to be an important component
in the future Internet.
This article introduces upcoming security challenges for cloud services
such as multi-tenancy, transparency and establishing trust into correct
operation, and security interoperability. For each of these challenges, we
introduce existing concepts to mitigate these risks and survey related
research in these areas.
1 Cloud Computing and the Future Internet
Cloud computing is expected to become a backbone technology of the Future
Internet that provides Internet-scale and service-oriented access to virtualized
computing, data storage and network resources as well as higher level services.
In contrast to the current cloud market that is mainly characterized by isolated
providers, cloud computing in the Future Internet is expected to be character-
ized by a seamless cloud capacity federation of independent providers - similar
to the network peering and IP transit purchasing of ISPs in today’s Internet.
For an end-user this means that via interacting with one cloud provider, re-
sources and services provided by multiple similar providers are seamlessly ac-
cessed. Cloud computing goes beyond technological infrastructure that derives
from the convergence of computer server power, storage and network bandwidth.
It is a new business and distribution model for computing that establishes a new
relationship between the end user and the data center, which “. . . gives the user
’programmatic control’ over a part of the data center” [1, pp. 8-9].
For this cloud-of-clouds vision4this article will investigate the related chal-
lenges for trust and security architectures and mechanisms.
4 For which the Internet pioneer Vint Cerf has recently suggested the term “Inter-
cloud”
J. Domingue et al. (Eds.): Future Internet Assembly, LNCS 6656, pp. 209–221, 2011.
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FIA projects like RESERVOIR or VISION are conducting research on core
technological foundations of the cloud-of-clouds such as federation technologies,
interoperability standards or placement policies for virtual images or data across
providers. Many of these developments can be expected to be transferred into
the Future Internet Core Platform project that will launch in 2011. This goes
along with increased collaboration on open cloud standards under developments
by groups such as the DMTF Open Clouds Standards Incubator, the SNIA
Cloud Storage Technical Working Group or the OGF Open Clouds Computing
Interface Working Group.
Trust and security are often regarded as an afterthought in this context, but
they may ultimately present major inhibitors for the cloud-of-clouds vision. An
important property of this emerging infrastructure will be the need to respect
global legal requirements. Today, since the current legal systems are not prepared
for the challenges that result from the complexity and pervasiveness of cloud
computing, data protection and privacy issues as well as liability and compliance
problems may hinder to tap the full potential of cloud computing [22,8,26]. By
clouds becoming regulation-aware, in the sense that it will ensure that data
mobility is limited to ensure compliance with a wide range of diﬀerent national
legislation including privacy legislation such as the EU Data Protection Directive
95/46/EC.
As of today, cloud computing is facing signiﬁcant acceptance hurdles when it
comes to hosting important business applications or critical infrastructures such
as those of the usage domains addressed by FIA. This article will illustrate the
reasons for this, and discuss the complex trust and security requirements. Fur-
thermore, we survey existing components to overcome these security and privacy
risks. We will explain the state-of-the-art in addressing these requirements and
give an overview of related ongoing international, and particularly EU research
activities as well as derive future directions of technology development.
2 Trust and Security Limitations of Global
Cloud Infrastructures
2.1 Cloud Security Oﬀerings Today
According to the analyst enterprise Forrester Research and their study “Security
and the Cloud” [17] the cloud security market is expected to grow to 1.5 billion
$ by 2015 and to approach 5 % of overall IT security spending. Whereas today
identity management and encryption solutions represent the largest share of this
market, particular growth can be expected in three directions:
1. securing commercial clouds to meet the requirements of speciﬁc market seg-
ments
2. bespoke highly secure private clouds
3. a new range of providers oﬀering cloud security services to add external
security to public clouds
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An example for the ﬁrst category is the Google gov.app cloud launched in
September 2009 that oﬀers a completely segregated cloud targeted exclusively
at US government customers. Similarly, IBM has launched a FISMA compliant
Federal Community Cloud in 2010.
Other cloud providers also adapt basic service security to the needs of spe-
ciﬁc markets and communities. Following its software-plus-services strategy an-
nounced in 2007, Microsoft has developed in the past years several SaaS cloud
services such as the Business Productivity Online Suite (BPOS). While all of
them may be delivered from a multi-tenant public cloud for the entry level
user, Microsoft oﬀers dedicated private cloud hosting and supports third-party
or customer-site hosting. This allows tailor made solutions to speciﬁc security
concerns - in particular in view of the needs of larger customers. In the same way,
the base security of Microsoft public cloud services is adapted to the targeted
market. Whereas Microsoft uses, e.g., for the Oﬃce Live Workspace - in analogy
to what Google does with Gmail - unencrypted data transfer between the cloud
and the user, cloud services for more sensitive markets (such as Microsoft Health
Vault) use SSL encryption by default.
On the other hand commodity public cloud services such as the Amazon EC2
are still growing even though they oﬀer only limited base security and largely
transfer responsibility for security to the customer. Therefore in parallel to the
diﬀerentiated security oﬀerings via bespoke private or community clouds, there
is also a growing complementary service market to enable enhanced security for
public clouds. Here a prime target is the small to mid-size enterprise market.
Examples for supplementary services are threat surveillance (e.g,. AlertLogic),
access- and identity management (e.g., Novell, IBM), virtual private network-
ing (e.g., Amazon Virtual Private Cloud), encryption (e.g., Amazon managed
encryption services) and web traﬃc ﬁltering services (e.g., Zscaler, ScanSafe).
2.2 Today’s Datacenters as the Benchmark for the Cloud
Using technology always constitutes a certain risk. If the IT of any given business
failed, the consequences for most of today’s enterprises would be severe. Even if
multiple lines of defense are used (e.g., ﬁrewalls, intrusion defense, and protection
of each host), all systems usually contain errors that can be found and exploited.
While oﬀ-line systems are harder to attack, exchanging media such as USB sticks
allows transfer into systems that are not connected to the Internet [5].
Cloudsourcing [15] follows more or less the same economic rationale as tra-
ditional IT-outsourcing but provides more beneﬁts, inter alia with regard to
upgrades and patches, quick procurement services, avoidance of vendor lock-ins,
and legacy modernization [18]. Many cloudsourcers oﬀer bundles of consulting
services, application development, migration, and management [14]. A problem
that remains with this new stage of IT-outsourcing strategies is that the client
still has to ﬁnd trustworthy service providers. However, this problem has been
solved in earlier forms of IT outsourcing, therefore it is not very likely that the
emergence of new business opportunities and business models will fail on this
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point. Rather than that, cloud computing might be signiﬁcantly hindered by the
legal problems that remain to be solved.
For the security objectives when adopting clouds for hosting critical systems
we believe that today’s datacenters are the benchmark for new cloud deploy-
ments. Overall, the beneﬁts need to outweigh the potential disadvantages and
risks. While the cost and ﬂexibility beneﬁts of using clouds are easy to quan-
tify, potential disadvantages and risks are harder to qualitatively assess or even
quantitatively measure. An important aspect for this equation is the perceived
level of uncertainty: For instance, a low but contractually guaranteed availability
(such as 98% availability) will allow enterprises to pick workloads that do not
require higher guarantees. Today, uncertainty about the actual availability does
not allow enterprises to make such risk-management decisions and thus will only
allow hosting of uncritical workloads on the cloud.
For security this argument leads to two requirements for cloud adoption by
enterprises: The ﬁrst is that with respect to security and trust, new solutions
such as the cloud or cloud-of-clouds will be compared and benchmarked against
existing solutions such as enterprise or outsourced datacenters. The second is
that in order to allow migration of critical workloads to the cloud, cloud providers
must enable enterprises to integrate cloud infrastructures into their overall risk
management. We will use these requirements in our subsequent arguments.
3 New Security and Privacy Risks and Emerging
Security Controls
Cloud computing being a novel technology introduces new security risks [7] that
need to be mitigated. As a consequence, cautious monitoring and management
of security risks [13] is essential (see Figure 1 for a sketch following [12]).
We now survey selected security and privacy risks where importance has been
increased by the cloud and identify potential security controls for mitigating
those risks.








Fig. 1. Simpliﬁed Process for Managing Security Risks [12])
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3.1 Isolation Breach between Multiple Customers
Cloud environments aim at eﬃciencies of scale by increased sharing resources
between multiple customers. As a consequence, data leakage and service disrup-
tions gain importance and may propagate through such shared resources. An
important requirement is that data cannot leak between customers and that
malfunction or misbehavior by one customer must not lead to violations of the
service-level agreement of other customers.
  
Fig. 2. Multi-tenancy at Multiple Levels [25].
Traditional enterprise outsourcing ensures the so-called “multi-tenant isolation”
through dedicated infrastructure for each individual customer and data wiping
before re-use. Sharing of resources and multi-tenant isolation can be implemented
on diﬀerent levels of abstraction (see Figure 2). Coarse-grained mechanisms such
as shared datacenters, hosts, and networks are well-understood and technologies
such as virtual machines, vLANs, or SANs provide isolation. Sharing resources
such as operating systems, middleware, or actual software requires a case-by-case
design of isolation mechanisms. In particular the last example of Software-as-a-
Service requires that each data instance is assigned to a customer and that
these instances cannot be accessed by other customers. Note that in practice,
these mechanisms are often mixed: While an enterprise customer may own a vir-
tual machine (Machine-level isolation), this machine may use a database server
(Middleware isolation) and provide services to multiple individual departments
(Application isolation).
In order to mitigate this risk in a cloud computing environment, multi-tenant
isolation ensures customer isolation. A principle to structure isolation manage-
ment is One way to implement such isolation is labeling and ﬂow control:
Labeling: By default all resources are assigned to a customer and labeled with a
corresponding label.
Flow control: Shared resources must moderate potential data ﬂow and ensure
that no unauthorized data ﬂow occurs between customers. To limit ﬂow
control, mechanisms such as access control that ensures that machines and
applications of one customer cannot access data or resources from other
customers can be used.
Actual systems then need to implement this principle for all shared resources [4]
(see, e.g., [2,3] for network isolation). An important challenge in practice is to
identify and moderate all undesired information ﬂows [19].
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3.2 Insider Attacks by Cloud Administrators
A second important security risk is the accidental or malicious misbehavior of in-
siders that increased due to global operations and a focus on low cost. Examples
may include a network administrator impacting database operations or admin-
istrators stealing and disclosing data. This risk is hard to mitigate since security
controls need to strike a balance between the power needed to administrate and
the security of the administrated systems.
A practical approach to minimize this risk is to adhere to a least-privilege
approach for designing cloud management systems. This means that cloud man-
agement systems should provide a ﬁne-grained role hierarchy with clearly deﬁned
separation of duty constraints. The goal is to ensure that each administrator only
holds minimized privileges to perform the job at hand. While today, operators
often have god-like privileges, by implementing a least privilege approach, the
following objectives can be met:
– Infrastructure administrators can modify their infrastructure (network, disks,
and machines) but can no longer access the stored or transported data.
– Security administrators can design and deﬁne policies but cannot play any
other roles.
– Customer employees can access their respective data and systems (or parts
thereof) but cannot access infrastructure or data owned by diﬀerent cus-
tomers.
This so-called privileged identity management system is starting to be imple-
mented today and should be mandated for cloud deployments. In today’s out-
sourced datacenters where management tasks are often oﬀ-shored, it ensures that
the negative impact of remote administrators is limited and that their actions are
closely monitored. Such privileged identity management systems usually follow
an approach using the following steps:
1. Initially, roles are deﬁned that deﬁne the maximum privileges obtained by
individual administrators holding these roles. For instance, a database ad-
ministrator may only obtain administrative privileges over the tables owned
by its employer.
2. For a given task at hand, an administrator “checks out” the required priv-
ileges while documenting the task. For instance., a database administrator
asks for privileges to modify a given database schema.
3. The administrator performs the desired task.
4. The administrator returns the privileges.
Due to the corresponding logging, the security auditors can later determine which
employee has held what privileges at any given point in time. Furthermore,
for each privilege, the system documents for what task these privileges were
requested.
In the long run, these practical approaches may be complemented with
stronger protection by, e.g., trusted computing [21] or computations on out-
sourced data [20].
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3.3 Failures of the Cloud Management Systems
Due to the highly automated nature of the cloud management systems and the
high complexity of the managed systems, software quality plays an important
role in avoiding disruptions and service outages: Clouds gain eﬃciency by indus-
trializing the production of IT services through complete end-to-end automation.
This means that once errors occur in such complex and automated systems, man-
ual intervention for detecting and ﬁxing faults may lead to even more errors. It is
furthermore likely that due to the global scale, errors will be replicated globally
and thus can only be ﬁxed through automation.
Another source of failure stems from the fact that large-scale computing
clouds are often built using low-cost commodity hardware that fails (relatively)
often. This leads to frequent failures of machines that may also include a subset
of the management infrastructure.
The consequence of these facts is that automated fault tolerance, problem-
determination, and (self-)repair mechanisms will be commonly needed in the
cloud environment or recover from software and hardware failures.
For building such resilient systems, important tools are data replication,
atomic updates of replicated management data, and integrity checking of all data
received (see, e.g., [24]). In the longer run, usage of multiple clouds may further
improve resiliency (e.g., as pursued by the TClouds project www.tclouds-pro
ject.eu or proposed in [11]).
3.4 Lack of Transparency and Guarantees
While the proposed mechanisms to mitigate the identiﬁed risks are important,
security incidents are largely invisible to a customer: Data corruption may not
be detected for a long time. Data leakage by skilled insiders is unlikely to be
detected. Furthermore, the operational state and potential problems are usually
not communicated to the customer except after an outage has occurred.
An important requirement in a cloud setting is to move away from today’s
“black-box” approach to cloud computing where customers cannot obtain in-
sight on or evidence of correct cloud operations. A related challenge is how to
best foster trust of customers into correct operation of the cloud infrastructure.
While partial solutions exist as outlined below, there exists no well-accepted best
practice.
The existing approaches range from superﬁcial to academic. The prevailing
approach is the so-called best eﬀort approach where operators promise “to do
their best” but do not give any guarantees. This is common for free services
today. An improvement to this approach is third-party audits. This approach
is common to today’s outsourcing: (Cloud) service centers are validated by an
independent organization to satisfy well-deﬁned standards such as ISO27001
or SAS70. Customers can then be sure that the organization followed these
standards at the time of certiﬁcation. This approach is common best practice
today but still only ensures compliance at a point of time and due to it’s spot-
check approach may miss areas of non-compliance that by accident were not
checked.
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In the mid-term, it is important that cloud provider provide automated in-
terfaces for observation and incident handling [10]. This will allow customers to
automatically identify incidents and to analyze and react to such incidents.
In the long run, the ideal transparency mechanisms would guarantee that
processes are implemented such that the agreed upon procedures are followed,
the functional and non-functional requirements are met, and no data is corrupted
or leaked. In practice, these problems are largely unsolved. Cryptographers have
designed schemes such as homomorphic encryption [9] that allow veriﬁable com-
putation on encrypted data. However, the proposed schemes are too ineﬃcient
and do not meet the complete range of privacy requirements [23]. A more practi-
cal solution is to use Trusted Computing to verify correct policy enforcement [6].
Trusted computing instantiation as proposed by the Trusted Computing Group
(TCG) uses secure hardware to allow a stakeholder to perform attestation, i.e., to
obtain proof of the executables and conﬁguration that were loaded at boot-time
. However, run-time attestation solution still remains an open and challenging
problem.
3.5 What about Privacy Risks?
To enable trusted cloud computing, privacy protection is an essential require-
ment [26]. In simple terms, data privacy aims at protecting personally iden-
tiﬁable data (PID). In Europe, Article 8 of the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights (ECHR) provides a right to respect for ones “private and family
life, his home and his correspondence”. The European Court of Human Rights
states in several decisions that this article also safeguards the protection of an
individual’s PID. Furthermore, the European Data Protection Directive (Direc-
tive 95/46/EC) substantiates this right in order to establish a comprehensive
data protection system throughout Europe. This directive takes into account
the OECD privacy principles [16] which mandate several principles such as, e.g.,
limited collection of data, the authorization to collect data either by law or by
informed consent of the individual whose data are processed (“data subject”),
the right to correction and deletion as well as the necessity of reasonable security
safeguards for the collected data.
Since cloud computing often means outsourcing data processing, the user as
well as the data subject might face risks of data loss, corruption or wiretap-
ping due to the transfer to an external cloud provider. Related to these de-facto
obstructions in regard to the legal requirements, there are three particular chal-
lenges that need to be addressed by all cloud solutions: Transparency, technical
and organizational security safeguards and contractual commitments (e.g., Ser-
vice Level Agreements, Binding Corporate Rules).
According to European law, the user who processes PID in the cloud or else-
where remains responsible for the compliance with the aforementioned principles
of data privacy. Outsourcing data processing does not absolve the user from his
responsibilities and liabilities concerning the data. This means that the user
must be able to control and comprehend what happens to the data in the cloud
and which security measures are deployed. Therefore, the utmost transparency
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regarding the processes within the cloud is required to enable the user to carry
out his legal obligations. This might be technically realized by, e.g., installing
informative event and access logs which enable the user to retrace in detail what
happens to his data, where they are stored and who accesses them. Also, the
cloud service provider could prove to have an appropriate level of security mea-
surements by undergoing acknowledged auditing and certiﬁcation processes on
a regular basis. Legally, the compliance of the cloud service providers with the
European law may be ensured by a commitment to Binding Corporate Rules
(BCR). Another method is the implementation of Service Level Agreements
(SLAs) into the contracts, which guarantee the adherence to the spelled out pri-
vacy requirements. These SLAs could, for example, stipulate an enforcement of
privacy via contractual penalties in case of the breach of the agreement.
This applies all the more in cases of cross-border cloud computing with vari-
ous subcontracting cloud service providers. Subcontracts are already commonly
practiced in the cloud computing ﬁeld. Cloud services commonly rely on each
other, since their structures may be consecutively based upon each other. Hence,
a computing cloud may use the services of a storage cloud. Unlike local data
centers residing in a single country, such cloud infrastructures often extend over
multiple legislation and countries. Therefore, the question of applicable law and
safeguarding the user’s responsibilities regarding data privacy in cross-border
cloud scenarios is a matter of consequences for the use of these cloud services.
So to avoid unwanted disclosure of data, suﬃcient protection mechanisms need
to be established. These may also extend to the level of technical solutions,
such as encryption, data minimization or enforcement of processing according
to predeﬁned policies.
4 Open Research Challenges
Today’s technology for outsourcing and large-scale systems management laid
the foundation for cloud computing. Nevertheless, due to its global scale and
the need for full automation, there are still open research challenges that need
to be resolved in order to enable hosting of enterprise-class and critical systems
on a cloud.
Customer Isolation and Information Flow. For customer isolation, speciﬁc chal-
lenges are how to reliably manage isolation across various abstraction layers.
A single notion of customers needs to be implemented across diﬀerent systems.
Furthermore, data generated by systems need to be assigned to one or more
customers to enable access to critical data such as logs and monitoring data.
A particularly hard challenge will be to reduce the amount of covert and side
channels. Today, such channels are often frozen in hardware and thus cannot
easily be reduced.
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Insider Attacks. The second area of research are practical and cost-eﬃcient
schemes to mitigate the risk of insider fraud. The goal is to minimize the set
of trusted employees for each customer through implementing a rigorous least
privilege approach as well as corresponding controls to validate employee behav-
ior. Furthermore, a practical scheme needs to support overseas management to
reduce cost while still enabling compliance with privacy and other regulations.
Security Integration and Transparency. The third challenge is to allow customers
to continue operating a secure environment. This means that security infrastruc-
ture and systems within the cloud such as intrusion detection, event handling
and logging, virus scans, and access control need to be integrated into an over-
all security landscape for each individual customers. Depending on the type of
systems, this can be achieved by providing more transparency (e.g., visibility
of log-ﬁles) but may also require security technology within the cloud. One ex-
ample is intrusion detection: In order to allow customers to ’see’ intrusions on
the network within the cloud and correlate these intrusions with patterns in the
corporate network, the cloud provider either needs to allow the customer to run
intrusion detection systems within the cloud (which would raise privacy issues)
or else provide generic intrusion detection capabilities that each customer can
conﬁgure.
Multi-Compliance Clouds. The fourth challenge is how to build clouds that are
able to comply with multiple regulations at the same time. One example is the
health care sector: A health care cloud would need to satisfy various national or
regional privacy and health care regulations. Since manual implementation for
each customer will not be cost eﬃcient, an automated way to enforce diﬀerent
(hopefully non-conﬂicting) regulations would be needed.
One particular challenges in this are is to make regulations and the cloud
compatible. Today, regulations often mandate that data needs to be processed
in a particular country. This does not align well with today’s cloud architectures
and will result in higher cost. An alternative could be to deﬁne required protec-
tions and then leave it to the cloud provider to ﬁnd a certiﬁable way to provide
suﬃcient protection.
Federation and Secure Composition The ﬁnal area of research that we see is cloud
federation and secure composition: In order to further reduce the dependency
on an individual cloud, services will be obtained from and load balanced over
multiple clouds. If this is done properly, services will no longer depend on the
availability of any individual cloud.
From a security perspective, this will raise new challenges. Customers need
to provide a consistent security state over multiple clouds and provide means
to securely fail-over across multiple clouds. Similarly, services will be composed
from underlying services from other clouds. Without an accepted way to compose
services securely, such compositions would require validation of each individual
service based on ﬁxed sub-services.
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5 Outlook — The Path Ahead
Cloud computing is not new – it constitutes a new outsourcing delivery model
that aims to be closer to the vision of true utility computing. As such, it can rely
on security and privacy mechanisms that were developed for service-oriented ar-
chitectures and outsourcing. Unlike outsourcing, clouds are deployed on a global
scale where many customers share one cloud and multiple clouds are networked
and layered on top of each other. We surveyed security risks that gain importance
in this setting and surveyed potential solutions.
Today, demand for cloud security has increased but the oﬀered security is still
limited. We expect this to change and clouds with stronger security guarantees
will appear in the market. Initially, they will focus on security mechanisms like
isolation, conﬁdentiality through encryption, and data integrity through authen-
tication. However, we expect that they will then move on to the harder problems
such as providing veriﬁable transparency, to integrate with security management
systems of the customers, and to limit the risks imposed by misbehaving cloud
providers and their employees.
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